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The Role of Lawyers: Beyond Advocacy 
William Rich * 
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility com- 
mands that "A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously 
Within the Bounds of the Law.'" This fundamental duty pro- 
tects both the client as an individual and the legal system as a 
whole. The only bounds of representation are those established 
by law. In the course of proper client advocacy, "any lawful ob- 
jective" should be pursued through every "legally permissible 
means.'" Popular perceptions, professional training, and tradi- 
tional theories of practice all focus on the extreme role of the 
lawyer as advocate in the adversary system. 
Even superficial consideration, however, confirms that the 
lawyer's role frequently extends beyond that of advocacy. The 
Code of Professional Responsibility specifically recognizes the 
lawyer's role both as an advisor and as an advocate.' It is appro- 
priate and at times essential that the lawyer as adviser forecast 
the impact of a client's'alternative future conduct on other indi- 
viduals and the public at large. Furthermore, lawyers frequently 
recognize the need to act as intermediaries between clients and 
opposing parties when their clients' best interests are served as a 
result. The proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct spe- 
cifically develop that role.' 
The principal thrust of this article is to suggest that both 
lawyers and laymen need to understand the potential of non- 
adversarial dispute resolution. Litigation is often unnecessary 
and potentially destructive. Lawyers should be trained to recog- 
nize such situations and should be prepared to abandon their 
role as advocates; an advisory role can promote the long-range 
.* B.A., 1970, Oberlin College; J.D., 1975, University of California, Berkeley, (Boalt 
Hall); StafF Counsel at Legal Aid Society, Wichita, Kansas, 1975-77; Associate Professor, 
Washburn University School of Law. 
1. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE~PONSIBILITY canon 7 (1978). 
2. Id. at EC No. 7-1. 
3. Id. at EC No. 7-3. See also Thode, The Ethical Standard for the Advocate, 39 
TEX. L. REV. 575, 578-79 (1961). 
4. See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROPESSIONAL CONDUCT 94-98 (1980). 
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interests of both the parties and society. 
The specific ideas presented here have evolved over a period 
of several years. In law school, when first confronted with basic 
advocacy concepts, it was natural for me to ask questions about 
the lawyer's responsibility when the system breaks down. For in- 
stance, what should a lawyer do when one side is inadequately 
represented, particularly if the skill and resources of counsel 
rather than the merits of the case determine the outcome? Such 
questions were virtually ignored. The focus of law school train- 
ing traditionally has been the development of requisite skills so 
that in cases of inadequate representation, the better trained at- 
torneys will prevail. 
New, nagging doubts about the adequacy of the adversary 
system emerged when I entered practice. In some cases parties 
were driven apart and became increasingly hostile towards each 
other in reaction to the demands of opposing counsel. In other 
cases the adversary model was incomplete; lawyers frequently 
engaged in direct dispute resolution, particularly when either 
the opposing party was unrepresented or when both parties from 
the outset simply wanted help in resolving their differences. Of 
course, the admonition against multiple party representation 
created a natural barrier to direct, evenhanded dispute resolu- 
tion. It also created general discomfiture for me as a 
practitioner. 
In teaching law I found the pure advocacy-adversary model 
particularly seductive. The very act of pushing extreme positions 
and forcing students to do likewise forms the basis of the in- 
struction to "think like lawyers." New questions were piqued, 
however, through my participation in two seminars: "Humanis- 
tic Education in Law,'" and "Law, Society and the Moral Or- 
der."= In the second seminar I turned careful attention to the 
role of the lawyer in dispute resolution. This seminar provided a 
broad context for my study of this topic. The gap between legal 
and social norms was viewed in the context of the evolution of 
5. The program was sponsored by the Project for the Study and Application of Hu- 
manistic Education in Law, directed by Jack Himmebtein of Columbia University 
School of Law. 
6. The seminar was sponsored by the National Endowment for the Humanities, led 
by Professor Richard D. Schwartz of Syracuse University. It was part of the 1979 Sum- 
mer Humanities Seminar for Law Teachers. 
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societies. The multiplication of social control specialists, who 
tend to develop a subculture with legal norms for administrative 
convenience, was discussed. Finally, the inherent problems of a 
pluralistic society, with the inevitable conflict between uniform 
legal norms and diverging normative views within the society, 
was examined. 
The theoretical background I have described led in turn to 
the secondary questions that are of particular relevance to this 
article. If a gap exists between legal and societal norms, how can 
that gap be bridged in individual cases? If a source of the prob- 
lem is the specialization of lawyers, how can their role be 
changed to promote flexibility rather than the enforcement of 
expedient external norms? And given the realities of pluralism, 
how can the lawyer's role be adapted to lessen the clash between 
individual values and uniform legal norms? 
This article focuses on the benefits that may accrue by de- 
viating from the traditional adversarial model. First, the propo- 
sal of direct private dispute resolution in the context of available 
social-scientific evidence is examined. Next the principal antici- 
pated criticisms of such a proposal are addressed. Finally, the 
proposal is reviewed in relation to major shortcomings of the 
current legal system. 
A. Proposals for Direct Dispute Resolution 
Lawyers should, on occasion, forego their role as advocates 
and expand their role in direct private dispute resolution. Al- 
though this proposal presents a radical departure from the the- 
ory of the traditional adversary model, in practice much of what 
is described is commonplace. From such a perspective the pro- 
posal is partly polemic-a mere change in titles, or at most a 
moderate change in emphasis on themes well grounded in the 
traditional role of the American lawyer. 
Both mediation and formal arbitration are accepted terms 
of legal parlance. This proposal draws heavily from both. Unlike 
mediation, however, the lawyer at the request of the parties 
might assume an arbitral role to resolve an impasse. At the same 
time, the full trappings of formal arbitration would not be con- 
sistently necessary. Although the concepts of mediation and ar- 
bitration are separate and distinct, I suggest that a single lawyer 
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can bring both concepts to bear in the context of resolving an 
individual dispute and can thereby replace traditional represen- 
tation. Both mediation and arbitration have become highly for- 
malized, and in the process their application has become unduly 
limited. Greater emphasis and more flexibility could lead to the 
expanded application of these two concepts. 
Two examples will illustrate this reorientation towards di- 
rect dispute resolution. 
1. Domestic relations 
Few areas of the law strain the limits of the judicial system 
more than domestic relations. Both lawyers and judges agree 
that courts are ill-equipped to resolve the social and psychologi- 
cal problems that typically arise in divorce and custody dis- 
putes.' Accordingly, there has been substantial discussion of al- 
ternative dispute resolution processes varying from "summary 
dissolution" divorce laws8 to formal arbitration.. Coogler has 
proposed structured mediation in divorce settlement.1° Spencer 
and Zammit have proposed "mediation-arbitration" for private 
resolution of disputes between divorced or separated parents.ll 
Mnookin and Kornhauser have described the advantages of the 
"private ordering" of domestic disputes.la 
Most lawyers involved with divorce proceedings have had 
experience with the couple who, having agreed upon a divorce, 
jointly request that the lawyer "do it for them." The traditional, 
recommended response of the lawyer is to stress the adversary 
nature of the contemplated proceedings and the restriction that 
the lawyer can represent only a single party.lS Frequently, ways 
will be found to realize the couple's request without forcing the 
involvement of a second lawyer or doing violence to their prior 
7. See generally Spencer & Zammit, Mediation-Arbitration: A Proposal for Private 
Resolution of Disputes Between Divorced or Separated Parents, 1976 DUKE L.J. 911; 
Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indetermi- 
nacy, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PRoB. 226 (1975); Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the 
Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 990-96 (1979). 
8. See CAL. CIV. CODE $3 4550-4556 (West Supp. 12A 1980). 
9. See Spencer & Zammit, Reflections on Arbitration under the Family Dispute 
Services, 32 ARB. J .  111 (1977). 
10. 0. COOGLER, STRUCTURED MEDIATION m DIVORCE SETTLEMENT (1978). 
11. Spencer & Zammit, supra note 7, at 930-38. 
12. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 7, at 952-58. 
13. See generally ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY canon 5 (1978) and 
the associated ethical considerations and disciplinary rules. 
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agreement. Such arrangements, however, are the exception 
rather than the rule. 
As an alternative approach, lawyers should be encouraged to 
meet jointly with parties who agree that neither would actually 
be "represented" in the divorce process.14 The lawyer would ex- 
plain the issues that must be resolved in the divorce process, 
discuss operable legal principles that are likely to be relied upon 
by a court, and assist the parties in reaching an agreement re- 
garding those issues. If agreement is reached, the lawyer would 
then draft a petition, an answer, and a proposed journal entry, 
all to be presented by the parties to the court.16 
2. Partnership disputes 
A second example should further demystify this proposal. 
The lawyer's role in drafting contracts, partnership agreements, 
or articles of incorporation is well accepted.'. In such cases the 
lawyer who acts as more than a separate advocate is directly 
resolving disputes. That lawyer should recognize this and ex- 
plain to the parties the potential conflicts of interest present." 
With proper attention paid to potential conflicts, the lawyer's 
role could expand to direct resolution of disputes among part- 
ners or small businesses without assuming an advocacy,. 
posture.18 
14. Note that the newly proposed Model Rules, note 4 supra, do contemplate "rep- 
resentation" of clients as an intermediary. This article, in contrast, does not contemplate 
separate representation. During the formative stages of an agreement, "representation" 
need not occur. Upon reaching agreement, however, the agreement itself provides at least 
a theoretical basis for representation without conflict. In any circumstance, it should be 
clear that disclosure, not hairsplitting definitions of representation, forms the basis for 
ethical behavior in this context. 
15. I would further propose that the attorney be allowed to appear with the parties, 
not as their "representative" but as someone to provide explanation and to facilitate 
court review and adoption of the proposed decree. This proposed scenario could be mod- 
ified without doing violence to the basic role of the private lawyer in bringing parties to a 
divorce together for a resolution, rather than driving them apart. For a more elaborate 
proposal, see Spencer & Zammit, supra note 7, at 930-38. 
16. Note that the central representative role of the attorney in such a situation is 
normally to the entity. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY E C  NO. 5-18 
(1978). It is important to observe, however, that in the context of such representation 
other parties affected by the contract or agreement are normally not separately repre- 
sented and in effect rely upon the attorney to fairly protect all interests affected by the 
representative action. 
17. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIEUITY EC NO. 5-16 (1978). 
18. Note that large commercial interests regularly engage in an analogous process 
through formal arbitration, the costs of which are often prohibitive at the small business 
level. See Sander, Varieties of Dispute Recessing, 70 F.R.D. 111, 125-26 (1976). 
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A dispute resolution role for lawyers has been recognized by 
a Supreme Court Justice. In 1916 Justice Brandeis described es- 
sentially the same professional role as that of "lawyer for the 
sitatuion."lB The concept was developed in response to an attack 
at his Senate confirmation that he had upon occasion unethi- 
cally represented multiple clients with conflicts of interest. 
Brandeis defended the complex mediative roles he had played as 
both common and proper.a0 Eventually the charges against him 
were dropped amid concessions from other reputable lawyers 
that they had often acted in the same manner." 
More recently, Roland Paul has advocated a new role for 
lawyers in contract disputes." Paul forecasts economy in both 
time and expense by eliminating the "tug of war" between coun- 
sel. The middle-counsel or counsel for the transaction would be 
assigned to prepare and recommend an agreement believed to be 
"fair and in the interest of both parties."" Paul illustrates the 
advantages of the proposal as well as its compliance with ethical 
constraints. 
The divorce and contract examples described are not meant 
to suggest the limits of the concept. Roughly analogous legal 
roles have been described in such diverse contexts as landlord- 
tenant disputesa4 and criminal ~ornplaints.~~ The theme through- 
out is dispute resolution with minimal state involvement and 
without imposition of external norms inconsistent with the indi- 
vidual values and relationships involved. 
B. Social-Scientific Evidence 
The social need for nonadjudicative dispute resolution has 
been identified by numerous researchers. Anthropologists have 
provided insight as to the breadth of alternative dispute resolu- 
tion processesa6 and the particular importance of mediative as 
19. See G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 58 (1978). 
20. Frank, The Legal Ethics of Louis D. Brandeis, 17 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1965). 
21. G. Hazard, supra note 19, at 61. 
22. Paul, A New Role for Lawyers in Contract Negotiations, 62 A.B.A. J .  93 (1976). 
23. Id. 
24. Comment, Arbitration of Landlord-Tenant Disputes, 27 AM. U.L. REV. 407, 
418-32 (1978). 
25. Snyder, Crime and Community Mediation-the Boston Experience: A Prelimi- 
nary Report on the Dorchester Urban Court Program, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 737. 
26. See, e.g., K. LLEWELLYN & E. HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY (1941); Nader, Up 
the Anthropologist-Perspectives Gained from Studying Up, in REINVENTING ANTHRO- 
POLWY (D. Hymes ed. 1972). 
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well as adjudicative roles." 
In his analysis of dispute resolution in America, Felstiner 
identifies the complementary nature of adjudication, mediation, 
and avoidan~e.~~ Costs and limitations are associated with all of 
the alternatives. Mediation is viewed as having limited applica- 
bility in a technologically complex, rich society because of a lack 
of mediators who have shared cultural and social experiences 
with the disputants. Avoidance is the primary mechanism that 
Felstiner identifies as replacing inadequate dispute resolution. 
But even as described by Felstiner, avoidance is not a palliative 
for dispute resolution. Avoidance implies a lack of answers to 
the dispute and frequently disrupts relationships. In a complex 
society avoidance exacts substantial social and psychological 
costs.2e This simply underscores the need for improved dispute 
resolution. 
Danzig and Lowi reply to Professor Felstiner by stressing 
both the costs of avoidance and the unmet demand for media- 
ti~n.~O They posit the need to complement the courts by "the 
creation of fora where the process of mediation may 
Danzig and Lowi advocate alternative mediative models- "com- 
munity moots."a2 In doing so, however, they recognize the tradi- 
tional lawyer's mediative role. Their description of both the de- 
mand for and the benefits of such an alternative clearly 
complements the need for renewed emphasis of this role.as 
Felstiner's analysis of the anticipated social, psychological, 
and economic costs of alternative dispute resolution provides a 
basis for identification of those cases most susceptible to private 
dispute resolution. Cases in which the cost and delays of adjudi- 
cation are high and the cost of avoidance is also high should be 
best suited for such an alternative. More specifically, long term 
relationships with deep social and psychological roots, such as 
27. See generally Danzig, Toward the Creation of a Complementary, Decentralized 
System of Criminal Justice, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1973); Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms 
and Functions, 44 S.  CAL. L. REV. 305 (1971). 
28. Felstiner, Influences of Social Organization on Dispute Processing, 9 L. & SOC'Y 
REV. 63, 69-76 (1974). 
29. A discussion of these "costa" appears in Felstiner, Avoidance as Dispute 
Prwessing: An Elaboration, 9 L. & Sody REV. 695 (1975). 
30. Danzig & Lowi, Everyday Disputes and Mediation in the United States: A Re- 
ply to Professor Felstiner, 9 L. & SOC'Y REV. 675 (1975). 
31. Id. at 675. 
32. Id. at 685. 
33. The "community moot" idea is particularly aimed at resolving neighborhood 
disputes through a broader call for increased mediative channels for dispute resolution. 
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the divorce or partnership relationships previously described, 
are most apt for such treatment? 
Along with the identification of cases best suited for such a 
process, it is also important to acknowledge the type of cases for 
which assistance in dispute resolution without representation is 
particularly inappropriate. Any case in which either party is un- 
able or unwilling to voluntarily and unequivocally agree to the 
informal settlement arrived at through such a process should be 
rejected. Cases in which the parties do not know each other and 
are unlikely to have substantial future contact are less likely to 
result in voluntary private dispute resolution unless both have 
particular trust and confidence in the lawyer involved. Cases in 
which the parties have significant mental problems, cases involv- 
ing abuse, or cases with a long history of litigation are also un- 
likely to be amenable to settlement without representation." In 
addition, cases in which parties appear to occupy significantly 
unequal bargaining positions may well require that each be rep- 
resented in order to help equalize their relationship? 
The vast majority of divorces and partnership disputes may 
be best settled by separate representation. In many cases sepa- 
rate representation is the only possible alternative. But in many 
other cases the parties are capable and even anxious to settle 
and to preserve a good working relationship. Rather than frus- 
trate these interests and force parties apart, the legal profession 
should assist parties in coming together. 
IV. ANTICIPATED CRITICISMS OF THE PROPOSAL 
A. Why Lawyers? 
One of the f i s t  questions asked when this proposal was 
initially drafted was: "Why should lawyers be the ones to under- 
34. See Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111, 119 (1976). 
35. J. Pearson, Process of Dispute Resolution: Mediation in Criminal, Civil, and Do- 
mestic Relations Cases (June 7, 1980) (findings presented to the Law and Society Associ- 
ation, Research Committee on Sociology of Law, at  Madison, Wisconsin). 
36. See R. Cook, Neighborhood Justice Centera: What Types of Disputes are Appro- 
priate? (June 7, 1980) (unpublished paper presented to the Law and Society Assocation, 
Research Committee on Sociology of Law, at  Madison, Wisconsin). In the experience of 
the neighborhood justice center experimental programs, one general conclusion was that 
in unequal bargaining power situations, the more powerful party to a dispute was un- 
likely to cooperate with a voluntary mediative settlement. However, the obvious irony is 
that the legal system itself inadequately resolves disputes where inequality persists. See 
Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change, 9 L. & SOC'Y REV. 95 (1974). 
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take this non-advocacy role?" There are a number of straight- 
forward answers to the question. First, lawyers are frequently 
performing such roles already, although generally without ex- 
plicit acknowledgment. Secondly, the proposal does not 
necessarily imply that only lawyers should assume such roles; 
counselors, police, social workers, therapists, referees, 
ombudsmen, and the like can play substantial roles in direct dis- 
pute resolution. Finally, the "community moot," consumer com- 
plaint centers," and other proposals of the same genre are 
essentially complementary rather than competitive concepts for 
improving the effectiveness and availability of dispute 
resolution. 
Beyond these defensive responses, however, several specific 
reasons exist why lawyers are best suited to handle dispute reso- 
lution. Perhaps the most important is the need to recognize the 
future legal implications an legal objectives of any given settle- 
ment. Turning to the divorce situation as an example, proper 
anticipation of complex tax issues, of the problematic ambigui- 
ties of a visitation agreement, or of the need for education and 
medical expenses is best done by a lawyer. And the lawyer is 
best suited to draft the documents necessary to actually carry 
out such an agreement. 
Lawyers have been criticized, often justly, for getting car- 
ried away with their advocacy role. The question that follows is 
whether they would effectively reorient themselves towards di- 
rect dispute resolution if they turned away from advocacy. In 
addition to being trained as adversaries, however, lawyers are 
also trained to resolve disputes. Only the poor lawyer mechani- 
cally applies legal principles and in so doing fails to recognize a 
client's underlying interesta and emotions. The prospect of me- 
diating such interests and of bringing parties together in the 
process is not without foundation in the traditional practice of 
law. 
Those who strongly advocate mediation as an alternative to 
adjudication may question both the lack of structure in the dis- 
pute resolution proposal and the capability of lawyers to per- 
form such tasks. Coogler, in his description of the "structured 
mediation" alternative, describes it in stark contrast to the law- 
yer's role." At a recent conference a person involved with a me- 
37. Nader, Disputing Without the Force of Law, 88 YALE L.J. 998, 1003 (1979). 
38. Coogler, supra note 10, at 4. 
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diation experiment described with a look of horror the lawyer 
who apparently blew a divorce settlement by exclaiming: "You 
mean you're going to accept that?"8s But it is precisely for such 
reasons that I am proposing an alternative to traditional media- 
tion. Parties to a dispute should have some understanding of the 
likely consequences of submitting their case to a court. The me- 
diating lawyer would supply that understanding of conse- 
quences. The introduction of an element of mediation should 
not imply that the parties must totally abandon their knowledge 
of or contact with the standards and experiences of the general 
court system. 
In reference to the anthropological perspective discussed 
earlier, one should acknowledge that lawyers do not have the 
same shared community experience of the village leader in a 
traditional society.'O However, many law practices, particularly 
those in small towns and rural areas, are developed through 
strong community ties. The most dramatic shortcoming of the 
lawyer would arise in dealing across ethnic and socioeconomic 
lines. Even in that respect, a lawyer with an established divorce 
practice may gain substantial insight into the feelings and pri- 
orities of persons of different backgrounds within a specific com- 
munity. Thus, to the extent that lawyers are willing to reorient 
themselves towards direct dispute resolution and to apply both 
their knowledge of the law and their experience with parties to 
disputes, they may in fact be the persons with the best potential 
for fulfilling the adjudicative and mediative roles fulfilled by the 
community leader in traditional society. 
The proposal I am describing would draw heavily upon the 
legal expertise of the lawyer. It would also draw from the law- 
yer's sensitivity to individual and community values, which 
should already be an integral part of the practice of law. Rather 
than implying that lawyers are simply handy and that anyone 
could really perform the tasks described, this proposal implies 
that lawyers, who have substantial experience and expertise, 
should be the ones to undertake such a role. I do not mean to 
imply that lawyers are presently well-equipped for the interme- 
diary role described. The process should not be oversimplified, 
and the need for further profesional training should be recog- 
39. J. Pearson, supra note 35. 
40. See Felstiner, supra note 28, at 74-76. But see Danzig & Lowi, supra note 30, at 
682-85. 
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nized. Both legal education and the lawyering process could ben- 
efit from careful attention to the skills and concepts needed for 
effective nonadversarial dispute resolution. 
B. Ethical Implications 
This article started with a reference to the lawyer's duty as 
an advocate. When added to the prohibition of multiple repre- 
sentation in canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 
this duty creates a potential barrier that could prevent lawyers 
from fulfilling the proposed dispute resolution role." On closer 
analysis the role described may appear to be not only desirable 
but necessary if the ethical obligations of the lawyer are to be 
met. Ethics imply that the public be served honestly. From the 
most basic perspective, an educated public may both desire and 
be better served by a relationship that does not involve actual 
representation or advocacy. 
Thomas Morgan addressed this question of values in his ar- 
ticle, The Evol uing Concept of Professional Responsi b i l i t ~ . ~ ~  
Morgan argued that the public interest in "seeing justice done" 
and the related interest in expeditious and low cost dispute reso- 
lution deserve highest priority in the formulation of ethical 
norms.4s Thus, in some situations the public interest is best 
served by one lawyer acting as an intermediar~.~~ His examples, 
drawn from contract and divorce disputes, posit less disruption 
and better service from a single lawyer engaged to resolve differ- 
ences by eliminating the "combatant" role." 
The American Bar Association's discussion draft of the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct devotes an entire section 
to the definition of the lawyer's role as "Intermediary Between 
 client^."^^ The introduction to the section notes that "a lawyer 
acts as intermediary in seeking to establish or adjust a relation- 
ship between clients on an amicable and mutually advantageous 
basis." It then describes that role with examples ranging from 
financial reorganizations to probate. Both the "substantial ad- 
41. The central purpose of canon 5 of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility 
(1978) is that "A Lawyer Should Jhercise Independent Professional Judgment on Behalf 
of a Client." 
42. 90 HAW. L. REV. 702 (1977). 
43. Id. at 704. 
44. Id. at 727. 
45. Id. 
46. Model Rules, supra note 4, at 94-98. 
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vantages" and the risks of such a role are described by the pro- 
posed rules.47 
Despite the lack of similar definition in the current Code of 
Professional Responsibility, the prohibition of representation of 
multiple parties with conflicts of interest should not be inter- 
preted to preclude such an intermediary role. The concepts of 
arbitration and mediation enjoy firm historical support.48 The 
idea that lawyers can provide neutral advice when consulted by 
disputants is also well establi~hed.~~ Furthermore, as a matter of 
practical reality, generations of lawyers have assumed intermedi- 
ary roles when doing so was perceived to be in the best interest 
of the parties involved. 
While acknowledging the need for disclosure, Justice Bran- 
deis was resolute in arguing that it was "right" to act as "lawyer 
for the s i t~a t ion ."~~ A lingering ethical cloud, however, has 
helped make lawyers reluctant to discuss such a~tivities.~' While 
the fear of impropriety may have stimulated disclosure in some 
instances, it is more likely that the same fear has led others to 
47. Rule 5.1 defines the "Conditions for Acting as an Indermediary." 
(a) A lawyer may act as an intermediary between clients if: 
(1) the possibility of adjusting the clients' interests is strong; and 
(2) Each client will be able to make adequately informed decisions in 
the matter, and there is little likelihood that any of the clients will 
be significantly prejudiced if the contemplated adjustment of inter- 
ests is unsuccessful, and 
(3) The lawyer can act impartially and without improper effect on 
other services the lawyer is performing for any of the clients; and 
(4) The lawyer fully explains to each client the implications of the 
common representation, including the advantages and risks involved, 
and obtains each client's consent to the common representation. 
(b) While serving as intermediary a lawyer shall explain fully to each client the 
decisions to be made and the considerations relevant to making them, so that 
each client can make adequately informed decisions. 
Model Rules, supra note 4, at 95. Rule 5.2 provides for withdrawal from the intermedi- 
ary role. 
48. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC NO. 5-20 (1978): 
A lawyer is often asked to serve as an impartial arbitrator or mediator in mat- 
ters which involve present or former clients. He may serve in either capacity if 
he first discloses such present or future relationships. After a lawyer has under- 
taken to act as an impartial arbitrator or mediator, he should not thereafter 
represent in the dispute any of the parties involved. 
49. See id. at EC No. 7-3. 
50. See Hazard, supra note 19, at  58. 
51. "The role of lawyer for the situations may be too prone to abuse to be explicitly 
sanctioned." Id. at 67. He compares such a role to "a doctor's 'authority' to terminate 
the life of a hopeless patient: I t  can properly be undertaken only if it will not be ques- 
tioned afterwards." Id. 
THE ROLE OF LAWYERS 
cover up potential conflicts rather than risk either the loss of 
clients or censure from their colleages. This ethical cloud should 
be recognized as illusory provided the lawyer is consistent and 
explicit in identifying the role assumed.62 
The role of the lawyer as mediator, arbitrator, and adviser is 
beyond reproach. The real problem is that neither lawyers nor 
the public have consistently perceived or promoted the potential 
intermediary role that builds upon these concepts. The valid 
and substantial ethical complaints in this area accompany actual 
representation of conflicting parties, particularly when the na- 
ture of the relationship is shrouded in secrecy." The key, under- 
lying reason for avoiding the potential conflicts of multiple par- 
ties is the perceived "duty" of the lawyer to avoid diluting 
"loyalty" to a client? That basic concern is protected by a 
clearly adopted intermediary role which does not entail percep- 
tions of independent loyalty and which contemplates withdrawal 
in the event that separate representation becomes necessary. 
The lawyers' ethical obligations are thus better protected 
through an explicit assumption of a dispute resolution role than 
through the more casual and less explicit techniques of "working 
around" conflicts that have been traditionally tolerated in the 
legal practice. 
My final topic examines the need for a reorientation of the 
lawyer's role in light of current fundamental complaints about 
the legal system. Three major areas of complaint often arise: 
52. Assuming proper disclosure as required by canon 5 of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility, there are virtually no reported instances of disciplinary action based 
upon such activity. "Brandeis seems to have been the only first-class American lawyer 
whose professional ethics have been the subject of a formal investigation." Hazard, supra 
note 19, at 59. 
53. Disciplinary Rule 5-105 of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility (1978) 
provides that "a lawyer may represent multiple clients if it is obvious that he can ade- 
quately represent the interest of each and if each consents to the representation after 
full disclosure of the possible effect of such representation on the exercise of his indepen- 
dent professional judgment on behalf of each." 
54. Canon 6 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics (1936), the predecessor of the 
current ABA Code of Professional Responsibility (1978), specified that "a lawyer repre- 
sents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client it is his duty to contend for that 
which duty to another client requires him to oppose." Ethical consideration 5-14 of the 
current code precludes "acceptance or continuation of employment that will adversely 
afTect his judgement on behalf of or dilute his loyalty to a client." 
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problems relating to access (cost and delay), problems stemming 
from adversary relationships, and problems arising because of 
the gap between individual and legal norms. Admittedly, these 
are not the sole or even the most fundamental problems with the 
system, and the suggested change in the lawyer's role is by no 
means a "solution" to the problems. Nevertheless, the relation- 
ships between these problems and the proposal are relationships 
that should be identified and explored when analyzing the po- 
tential merit of this or any other proposal for reform of the legal 
system. Since this identification of issues is provided without an 
empirical base, it should be viewed simply as a potential frame- 
work for future analysis. 
A. The Problem of Access 
The most basic bar to access of the courts has long been 
cost. The term "law" has dramatically different connotations as 
viewed by the rich vis-a-vis the poor. For the wealthy it connotes 
justice; for the poor it creates apprehension. Even though legal 
services attorneys and public defenders have taken on the chal- 
lenge of remedying the traditional exclusion of the poor, the 
challenge is still far from being met. Furthermore, the high price 
of professional litigation has driven a large segment of the mid- 
dle income population away from the courts." 
It is impossible to prove that substantial reductions in cost 
would result from the proposal presented here." However, even 
if additional costa were incurred because the proposal were im- 
plemented and failed, a key difference exists between this pro- 
posal and many of the already attempted, formal efforts at me- 
diation and arbitration. This process is intended to operate 
simply and inexpensively, with only one lawyer and without ac- 
tual "legal representation." Consequently, this proposal would 
arguably result in greater savings than proposals ordinarily asso- 
ciated with formal arbitration." The simplicity of the proposal 
55. The question of who can ''afford" legal services is problematic given alternative 
demands against individual income and variations in the perceived value of legal repre- 
sentation. Thus, despite potentially "adequate" incomes, individuals may choose to 
avoid disputes rather than pay the met. See generally Felstiner, Influences of Social 
Organization on Dispute Resolution, 9 L. & MY REV. 63 (1974). 
56. Note, however, that Paul projects "an initial over-all savings of at least 35 to 40 
percent." Paul, supra note 22, at 93. Paul predicts not only direct savings because of the 
elimination of a lawyer, but also indirect savings because of a simplified negotiation 
process. 
57. Thus, traditional, formalized arbitration required that the litigants not only pay 
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would make it more acceptable to a broad range of potential 
litigants. 
The other major access problem in the legal system is delay. 
Although the claim that "justice delayed is justice denied" is not 
as poignant as the claim that "justice goes to the highest bid- 
der," it nevertheless has a ring of truth. Again, when this pro- 
posed settlement process breaks down and the parties are forced 
to seek separate counsel, even further delays would result. How- 
ever, the option of working with a single lawyer at least offers 
the potential of cutting through delays." 
B. Problems with the Adversary Relationship 
Events in recent years have brought into question lawyers' 
basic morality. Lawyers represent both sides in a controversy re- 
gardless of whether one side is "good" or the other "bad." The 
theory, of course, is that the role of the judge or jury is to re- 
solve the morality of the dispute. Meanwhile, the lawyer safe- 
guards the integrity of the system through advocacy on behalf of 
a single party to the dispute.5@ 
A primary problem is not the morality of the system as con- 
ceived but rather the difficulties that arise when the system fails. 
Implicit in the basic assumptions of legal training is the underly- 
ing belief that the lawyer's competence and effectiveness make a 
difference. But what happens to our concept of justice if results 
really do hinge on the competence of the advocate and not on 
the merits of the case?6o Of course, this question has been 
around as long as the adversary system itself. The standard re- 
sponse gives due deference to both the workability of the system 
for the arbitrator (who performs the role of judge but is not publicly supported) but also 
pay for the extensive involvement of their own counsel. 
58. See Paul, supra note 22, at  93-95, for a comparative analysis of the pace of nego- 
tiating a contract with a single lawyer acting for both parties as compared to that of two 
lawyers representing opposite sides. 
59. The morality of the lawyer should be contrasted with "Watergate morality." The 
lawyer serves a client (who can never be "above the law") to the maximum extent per- 
mitted by the law (while remaining true to the system). Legal ethics not only permit, but 
require, strong advocacy on behalf of the client once that relationship has been 
established. 
60. These questions are, of course, presented in their most extreme form when only 
one party to a dispute is represented. Conceivably, the judge can a d  to restore balance, 
but the felt need for representation belies such a solution. The problem is even more 
extreme if it can be shown that the system is skewed in favor of certain claimants, i.e., if 
the "haves" are more likely to win than the "have nots." See Galanter, supra note 36, at  
95. 
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(the system may be bad but it is the best we have) and the mo- 
rality of the system when it is in balance (assuming that all law- 
yers strive to be as good as their colleagues). 
Without demeaning the functional responses, I suggest this 
addition to the implicit traditional means versus ends calculus. 
Lawyers are taught that as advocates they should press the max- 
imum lawful claims of their clients. That process, however, 
forces a depersonalization of the adversary; the lawyer's concern 
for humanity are essentially limited to their own clients.61 Fur- 
thermore, the adversary process infuses the parties with the 
same spirit of adverseness and depersonalization. Although the 
process of settlement generally "brings the parties together" as 
to the terms of their specific dispute, it can also serve to deterio- 
rate the parties' underlying relationship. A graphic example reg- 
ularly occurs in divorce law. Many a couple reconciled to separa- 
tion has been driven to hostility by the maximum demands 
asserted by their spouse's lawyer. The typical response is: "If 
(s)he's going to try to wipe me out, then I'm going to fight over 
the kids."62 
My concern is for that category of cases where this process 
of alienation could be successfully avoided without doing vio- 
lence to the justifiably adverse interests of the persons involved. 
In this vein Professor Fuller notes that a primary result of medi- 
ation is the role played in reorienting the parties towards each 
other? The lawyer's role is also to maintain sensitivity towards 
the personal interests of both parties. One could again posit the 
particular benefit of such a process in the divorce context. As 
the growing number of alternative, no-fault divorce practices ex- 
emplifies, it should be clear that separate advocacy is not always 
essential in that context. Furthermore, the possibility of reduc- 
ing hostility-and in particular the lasting scars of a custody 
battle-provides substantial impetus for appropriate alterna- 
tives like those proposed here. 
61. For a discussion of the problems stemming from the narrow loyalty of lawyers to 
their clients, as well as the domination by lawyers of their clients, see Wasserstrom, Law- 
yers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 1 (1975). 
62. And to return to the spectre of unequal representation in this context it can be 
asked, "Where is the solace for the lawyer who knows that an issue such as child custody 
may rise or fall as a result of the skill and energy devoted to a particular client?" 
63. See Fuller, supra note 27, at 325. 
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C. Restraints of the Legal Order 
The third area of complaint against the legal system is more 
theoretical. In several ways the modern system has created a gap 
between legal norms and actual values or interests of individuals 
in the society. First, the mere (and necessary) formality of the 
rules of evidence and procedure can drive up cost, increase de- 
lays, and exclude from the court's consideration information 
that all parties might otherwise consider relevant and reliable. 
Second, and even more basic, the rules of law themselves may be 
out of step with the parties' values. Pluralism by definition sugr 
gests differences in perspective and potential conflicts in values. 
This problem is aggravated by efforts to minimize judicial dis- 
cretion in order to maximize predictability and efficiency." Such 
developments may of necessity increase alieniation towards the 
legal system in cases where freer discretion would produce more 
equitable results. 
Finally, legal rules are designed to be administered by law- 
yers. The language and the formalities create barriers between 
the parties and the resolution process. The lawyer's "profession- 
alism" discourages either participation or a genuine sense of 
control over b e  outcome of the dispute. The "priesthood" of 
lawyers reinforces this process.66 
The current legal order tends to place primary attention on 
rules of law and on the lawyers who understand and manipulate 
those rules rather than on the interests and values of the parties 
to a This problem can be somewhat ameloriated in the 
context of private direct dispute resolution. As an intermediary, 
the lawyer's task parallels that described by Professor Fuller: 
"[Mlediation is commonly directed, not to achieving conformity 
to norms, but toward the creation of the relevant norms them- 
selves."67 Although legal rules and potential legal consequences 
are not rendered irrelevant by such a role, they should be dis- 
lodged from the central role normally assumed when they inter- 
fere with the true goals of the parties. Individuals, lawyers and 
the legal order would all get along better if lawyers would act as 
intermediaries when the situation dictates. 
64. See generally Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111 (1976). 
65. See Auerbach, P@e of Lawyers, HARPER'S, October 1976, at 37. 
66. For a discussion of this perspective, see J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE 
Law (1976). 
67. Fuller, supra note 27, at 308. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Although traditionally identified with "good lawyering," an 
intermediary role is contrary to popular perceptions of the law- 
yer as advocate. The time has come to bring the intermediary 
out of the closet. The proposed Model Rules of Professional - 
Conduct will undoubtedly stimulate debate within the profes- 
sion and force movement in that direction. Significant change 
will only occur, however, when both the bar and the public dis- 
cover the potential role of lawyers beyond advocacy. 
